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Introduction
Dynamic-incentive effects of environmental policy are attracting an increasing research interest. Innovation is often the main response to environmental policies, and policy instruments may matter for 'induced innovation' effects, but shared conclusions about various theoretical and empirical issues are still lacking. An extensive review of theories and evidence on technological change and the environment, including the role of policy instruments, is presented in Jaffe et al. (2003) , who distinguish between analyses of 'induced innovation ' and 'evolutionary' approaches. Requate (2005) gives account of the present state of theoretical research on the dynamic incentives of different policy instruments, in particular economic instruments (EIs). Recent contributions address the determinants of 'environmental innovation', including policy instruments, on econometric grounds (for example, Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2005) . A growing stream of evolutionaryminded applied research projects addresses technological and organisational innovations associated to policy experiences, and in particular the role of institutional settings, observed industrial strategies, and policy-design approaches in influencing innovation (see, among others, Hemmelskamp et al., 2000; Klemmer, 1999; Kemp, 1997; Rennings et al., 2003) .
Most of available contributions do not go beyond a 'black-box' representation of dynamic-efficiency mechanisms stimulated by policies and their instruments. The works on 'induced innovation' based on neoclassical production functions and optimising behaviour on R&D investments, have difficulties in dealing with systemic uncertainties and 'on-the-path' adjustments typically characterising agents' behaviour in real innovation processes. Evolutionary approaches able to deal with this kind of systemic uncertainties and adaptations, sometimes have difficulties in dealing with the ex ante representation of how agents' cost-benefit considerations can guide innovation responses to policies and their instruments, thus limiting their usefulness to ex post comprehensive, multi-faceted interpretations of what actually happened. Therefore, the way EIs can work in favour or against innovation through agent reactions to EIs themselves is often left without a realistic ex ante representation. Furthermore, most part of research on EIs and innovation deals with pollution and climate change policies, also with the aim of modelling 'endogenous technological change', whereas other important policy areas, in particular waste and recycling, are still disregarded.
The aim of this paper is to make a step inside the 'black box' of 'induced innovation' and dynamic efficiency when innovation in response to EIs depends on the decisions of interdependent industrial actors 1 . More specifically, by taking an evolutionary perspective, we address the ways specific EIs reflecting the 'producer responsibility principle' (PRP) in waste and recycling policy can influence innovation when the relationships between various manufacturing industries with different interests about innovation are involved 2 .
We analyse a specific case study, the EU policy on End-of-Life Vehicles ( innovation is the only way to attain policy targets, and the innovative response should be systemic because, to attain those targets, it must involve interdependent innovations 1 Here we will use a very general concept of '(policy) induced innovation' that includes any kind of technological and organisational innovations that would not take place without policy and it is, therefore, 'induced' by policy itself. Our use of the concept is not limited to biased technological change in response to a change in relative factor prices caused by a price-based policy instruments. 2 See Stevens (2004) for a general framework of the relationships between '(extended) producer responsibility principle' and innovation. generated by different industrial agents; (ii) the superiority of EIs over VAs or vice versa has been the source of a many-years debate between industry and policy-makers, but it has never been studied on a sound analytical basis; EIs and VAs were both finally included in the Directive 2000/53 as a 'political' compromise; (iii) the ELV case has been analysed from the perspective of voluntary agreements (Aggeri and Autchel 1997; Aggeri, 1999; EEA 1997 ) with a minor attention paid to innovation or, conversely, from the perspective of company-level innovation capabilities (Den Hond 1996) ; EIs, instead, received minor attention while the policy debate has been largely focused on them; (iv) it shares similarities with other EU policies, in particular packaging policies and the EU Directives on electric and electronic waste -WEEE (see European Commission, 2000) .
Although the still open state of ELV policy implementation does not allow us to perform a true ex post analysis on EIs and induced innovation, extensive information exists about policy-induced industrial innovation efforts, about industrial actors' views and strategies on the (expected) impacts of EIs, and about some impacts of specific EIs' at a certain implementation stage (generally early stage) 3 . From this mixed ex ante/ex post knowledge base, we shall propose an enlargement of theoretical hypotheses and model-making assumptions about EIs and dynamic efficiency for a class of policies characterised by: (a) the use of EIs reflecting the 'producer responsibility principle', also in combination with other instruments aiming at the same policy objectives; (b) the involvement of many industries with very different technological profile and capabilities, market position and power, and economic interests towards the investments stimulated by policy; (c) innovation is the only or the critical factor for achieving policy targets.
3 After a preliminary work on the ELV issue (Zoboli, 1998) , the research work presented in Zoboli et al. (2000) was based, inter alia, on an extensive set of interviews carried out in 1999-2000, i.e. the most critical phase of the policy debate in Europe. The 43 interviews included: 23 interviews with car makers (10), materials and car-component industries, and managers of ELV agreements in 6 European countries; 9 interviews with European professional associations of material and recycling industries; 11 interviews with officers of the European Commission in 3 different directorates (Enterprise, Environment, and Research). We monitored the development of ELV policies and industrial initiatives for the subsequent years, and we carried out a specific research work on Sweden (Zoboli et al., 2003) based on direct interviews.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ELV case study focussing on the development of the EU Directive and national policies. Section 3 presents the features of ELV-related innovation, outlining different 'innovation paths'. Section 4 addresses the role of economic instruments in orienting ELV-related innovation. Section 5 concludes and highlights some policy making issues. The Appendix illustrates the basic economics of the free take-back instrument.
The ELV problem and policy responses
The exact number of old cars deregistered in EU Member States and becoming ELVs to be treated (dismantling, de-pollution, reuse of parts, wreck shredding, recycling of materials, energy recovery or landfilling of final residues) is surprisingly still uncertain.
The estimate given in a draft of the EU Directive proposal in 1997 was of 8-9 million automobiles, but it was questioned given the high number of ELVs deregistered in EU countries and exported to non-EU countries for treatment or re-use as second-hand cars. The number of ELVs to be domestically treated in EU countries was roughly 7,5 million units in 1998 (our estimate, see Zoboli et al. 2000) , a figure confirmed by the latest ACEA (Association of Car Manufacturers Europe) surveys, which indicate around 7.7 million units to be treated in EU15 and Norway out of 11.5 million cars de-
The economic value of an ELV to final owners may be either positive or negative.
When car deregistration and delivery involves a payment to a dismantler, because there are few or none valuable parts to reuse, an incentive to illegally abandon the car in the environment arises. There are no reliable figures on the number of ELVs abandoned in the environment, but it is a recurring phenomenon in some countries (see Lee et al., 1992) . 4 The huge difference between the number of de-registered cars and those treated in Member States is due to shredding without pre-treatment, illegal treatment, abandoned vehicles, and export. A large part of the whole difference for EU15 is due to Germany (3. During the 1990s, the options for innovation became well-defined even in the absence of precise legal obligations and economic instruments in most national schemes (see Zoboli, 1998) . After the EU Directive, the level and the legally-binding nature of policy targets on RRR determined the insufficiency of actual and expected results of industrial initiatives and multi-sector VAs. Two key issues emerge: (a) any single specific innovation is unable to achieve RRR targets set by Directive 2000/53; as a consequence interdependent inter-industry innovations (from car design to ASR treatment) must be pursued; (b) the achievement of the RRR targets implies an 'economic-value deficit' in the short run, because there are underdeveloped markets for the additional flow of materials and energy feed-stocks deriving from higher RRR rates.
The induced innovation process
We shall analyse these issues by addressing:
(a) the features of the innovation process in the ELV case;
(b) the dynamic-incentive properties of economic instruments in such a process.
Specific innovations
Some specific innovations pursued by Europe-based car companies during the last decade are summarised in Figure 2 .
The creation of networks of dismantlers/shredders linked to individual car companies has been a major organisational innovation given the previously existing limited relationships between the car industry and post-consumer ELV treatments.
However, contractual arrangements between the main actors (carmakers, dismantlers, shredders, and recyclers) differ from country to country. 
Innovation paths
None of above-mentioned innovations has the potential to attain the RRR targets of Directive 2000/53 if taken alone. Innovations with the highest potential contribution (plastic recycling) are the less developed for technical and/or economic reasons.
The innovation process, therefore, must be composed of alternative/complementary sequences of interrelated innovations, that should allow the achievement of defined RRR targets. We define these sequences as "innovation paths", or "vertically-integrated innovation options", and take them as reference for evaluating the possible impacts of ELV policies.
Three main innovation paths can be identified ( Figure 3 ):
(a) "material-market creation path"; (b) "energy-market creation path"; (c) "radical substitution path".
Material-market creation path
Taking as given the current car material composition, the sustainable achievement of a reduced amount of land-filled ASR is only partly a problem of incremental RRR at the margin for materials that already have a well-developed secondary market (ferrous metals). Instead, it requires market creation for the parts, components and materials currently not recovered, reused and recycled. This can be thought as an upstreamoriented series of necessary (but not sufficient) innovations in the technical viability of recycled metals in existing or new uses, innovative changes in dismantling activities, innovations at the upstream car making stage through developments in DFD/DFR. In the end, the process requires interdependent changes in different industries.
Technologies leading to material recovery of ASR can be considered as a form of material markets creation. The material-market creation path can combine relatively high ELV "recyclability" with relatively small and/or well-focused car-design changes.
This is the path more desired by EU policy makers that draw Directive 2000/53.
Energy-market creation path
An alternative route of market creation is the development of the energy recovery of creation. It does not imply trade-offs with energy-emission requirements in car making because it allows for the continuation of the current trend towards composites and polymer-based light materials. Though EU policy targets allow energy recovery to be a share of incremental RRR rates, the pursuit of an energy recovery path is constrained by the provisions of Directive 2000/53.
Radical substitution path
The difficulties in pursuing "material market creation" and/or "energy market creation" paths, may stimulate more radical adaptations of design and material choice in the upstream part of the ELV system. A radical design choice is one associated to the reduction of car materials currently having weak recycling markets. The substitution process should consist of a reduced propensity to introduce complex and advanced materials not technically and/or economically suitable for recycling. The possible tradeoff between increased recyclability on the one hand, and simplification of production and lower emission levels on the other hand, suggests that this innovation path can influence other car-related innovation trajectories. It reduces the need for developing "new" recycling markets (some plastics) and can create, instead, a problem of marginally increasing quantities in well-established recycling markets (some metals). It also reduces incentives for innovations in ASR (energy) recovery.
Selection uncertainties
The "selection" of a dominant innovation path is still marked by uncertainties associated to the following factors:
1. Technological uncertainty and learning. Environmental, technological, and economic results associated to each innovation path are still not completely known and various specific innovations composing the three paths are not at advanced stages. The (un)certainty about results, in fact, emerges and evolve during the same process of path selection. The process is clearly an evolutionary one based on cumulative knowledge and capability-creation through both focused R&D and learning by experience (Den Hond, 1996 Zoboli et al. 2000) . This makes the selection process a very interactive one even without introducing EIs that necessarily impact the cost-benefit balances of the different actors.
Economic instruments and the selection of innovation paths
The Directive 2000/53, as well as some national VAs, adopted an '(extended) producer responsibility principle' and introduced forms of EIs. Generally speaking, the EU policy approach to ELV has been not too different from that characterising 12 It can be noted that no formal cost benefit analysis has been performed by policy makers before the introduction of ELV regulation. The scarcity of formal and transparent cost benefit estimates also applies to industrial stakeholders. The issue of (lacking) ex ante regulation impact analysis for ELV directive and the lack of transparent cost-benefit estimates by industry is discussed in Onida (2000) and Zoboli et al. (2000) .
packaging waste, in which the 'producer responsibility principle' has been the cornerstone to achieve higher RRR targets 13 .
We will address the possible role of EIs, focussing in particular on the free-take-back (FTB) mechanism introduced by Directive 2000/53, in pushing the ELV system toward the innovation paths we have defined above 14 . We aim at highlighting that the extent to which EIs stimulate (policy-desired) innovation path(s) can be different from what expected, as result of: (a) the systemic features of the inter-industry innovation process and the cost-benefit considerations by single industrial actors; (b) the difficulties in giving the instrument the best configuration in practice in terms of effectiveness 15 .
Policy making and instrument choice
The policy-makers objective is to minimise the three main ELV-related sources of environmental externalities: (a) The dumping of ELVs in the environment; (b) The release of pollutants in ELV treatment operations, and (c) The landfilling of ASR at the final stage of treatment (see Figure 1 ). The usual reason underlying the introduction of 13 An extensive discussion of the economics of 'extended producer responsibility' is presented in OECD (2004) and in particular in the work by Walls (2004) . The Directives 1994/62 on packaging and packaging waste did not explicitly mention a 'producer responsibility principle' but gave rise, de facto, to a major case of PRP application in EU environmental policy. The Directive 2004/12/EC emending the 1994 directive on packaging and packaging waste, instead makes extensive reference to 'producer responsibility', also in terms of 'financial responsibility'. The Commission is currently producing an ex post evaluation of the 1994 packaging Directive. 14 FTB impose car producers to take back free of charge the ELVs of their own make, and its inclusion among economic instruments might be questioned by a rigid reference to standard classifications. Though the price incentive is not clear cut as for Pigovian taxes and market permits, FTB obligations introduce a cost for carmakers that is an incentive to produce more recyclable and recoverable cars, i.e. to produce less externalities in the post consumer treatment/disposal, in order to reduce the burden of FTB itself. Thus, the incentive mechanism of FTB is similar to a tax on externalities when the 'producer of the good' is assumed to be the 'producer of the externalities' associated to the post-consumer stage of the good itself. Furthermore, FTB is applied to each ELV even after policy targets on RRR are attained, which is a common incentive feature of economic instruments, e.g. Pigouvian taxes. The difference with CAC and regulatory standards is clear in any case. See also Par. 4.2 and 4.3 and the Appendix for a more detailed explanation. 15 As stated in the Introduction, our main aim is to highlight the mechanism by which EIs can influence induced innovation in specific class of policies applied to specific industrial/innovation settings. We are not performing an ex post evaluation of policy instruments cost-efficiency/effectiveness. Therefore, we think we are not incurring in the methodological limitations characterising the impact analysis of a single policy instrument outside its policy package. For a methodological note on ex post policy effectiveness evaluation see Mazzanti et al. (2003) .
EIs is the expectation that they are more cost-effective for the achievement of objectives Concerning externality (a), it is reasonable to expect that reducing or eliminating the cost of delivery (by FTB or other instruments, see below) will increase the delivery rate to dismantlers. As regards externality (b), the reduction of externalities during ELV dismantling and treatment can be pursued by CAC regulation -and it is so in Directive 2000/53 and all national VAs/regulations. However, by using EIs to cover (part of the) additional costs of environmentally-safe ELV dismantling and treatment, the development of 'clean' and efficient dismantling activities can be promoted, and it is the first stage of the 'market creation path' we depicted 16 . As regards externality (c), in a material balance perspective, a reduced landfilled amount of ASR necessarily corresponds to higher RRR rates and vice versa, and a reasonable way to achieve it is to push industrial actors towards innovation efforts in the upstream phases preceding ASR landfilling. However, the achievement of higher RRR rates implies an 'economic-value deficit' due to missing or very underdeveloped markets for the additional materials. No involved sector/industry will voluntarily support it. Therefore, EIs can be introduced to reveal and allocate the economic-value deficit to one or more actors. The addressed industrial actor(s) should be stimulated to undertake innovation efforts that should contribute to achieving RRR targets and, at the same time, to absorb the economic value deficit, possibly along the innovation paths depicted above.
Which economic instrument?
We assume that the depicted framework (Figure 4 ) summarises the 'average knowledge' of policy makers concerning the impacts of different EIs. Which are the best economic instruments among those in Figure 4 to achieve objectives (a), (b), (c)?
Even in this case, neither EU/national policy makers nor industrial stakeholders produced rigorous economic analyses demonstrating the superiority of the specific EI they have chosen in practice (or the superiority of VAs promoted by industrial stakeholders).
Policy makers necessarily have only a partial knowledge of the full impact (direct and indirect, short term and long term) of specific instruments either because the policy is completely new or because they did not perform a complete ex ante analysis of expected impacts 17 . Furthermore, the same externality can be addressed by different EIs imposed on different actors and markets; and one instrument can address more than one externality due to inter-industry technical/economic relationships. Finally, each instrument is expected to stimulate specific innovations, which are not full innovation paths. Therefore, chains of reactions to the chosen EI should be considered, and the 'average knowledge' could be not complete concerning them, especially for indirect effects.
While ex ante there is an over-choice of instruments, the range considered in ELV debate and in practical applications has been restricted to: (1) free take back (FTB), (2) recycling fees, and (3) deposit-refund systems. order to reduce the burden of FTB (the easier it is to RRR a car, the lower the cost of FTB). Therefore, it potentially addresses all the three objectives of ELV policy described above. Actually, the key policy concept behind the FTB of ELV Directive proposal of 1997 has been that the costs of higher RRR rates should not be supported by consumers and/or dismantlers/recyclers because the high costs of car RRR are a consequence of car-making choices at the upstream level of the chain, i.e. design and material mix (Onida, 2000) . The three EI formulations sketched above suggest that the EI is directly applied to some economic actors, but it is expected (by policy makers) to generate spillovers on other actors due to technical or economic (market) links among them, as drawn out in This key issue of the relationship between EIs and innovation can be highlighted by looking at the implications of an EI configuration in terms of induced innovation paths.
Recycling fees (the Netherlands
We shall analyse the implications of a specific FTB configuration.
FTB and innovation paths
The Appendix illustrates a simplified competitive market for ELVs (supply by final owners and demand by dismantlers) and the comparative statics of the FTB configuration of the 1997 Directive Proposal. The final car-owner is allowed to deliver 19 Arguments in favour of different implications of FTB and recycling fee are proposed by Palmer and Walls (1999) .
his/her old car to a dismantling facility at zero cost. It means that, if he/she has to pay the dismantler for delivering the car (i.e. the value/price of ELV is negative), he/she can be fully reimbursed by the producer of his/her car. The key point is that, in this form of FTB, dismantlers can freely establish the price for the ELVs they buy from final owners.
As shown in the Appendix, it is in the dismantlers interest to pay negative prices for ELVs, while the final owner is fully reimbursed by the carmaker and then it is likely he/she becomes indifferent to ELV prices. The car industry bears the full cost without participating in the transaction.
This is equivalent to a tax on ELV paid by carmakers, of which the revenue is 
EIs performance with voluntary agreements
EIs and VAs have long been debated as alternative approaches to ELV policy, the former being supported by policy makers and the latter by carmakers. The two approaches should be considered jointly after the Art. FTB introduced by direct regulation. All in all, the combination between VAs and Eis, which has been a 'political compromise' in Directive 2000/53, seems to be favourable to effectiveness and innovation on technical grounds because it reduces the possibility policy-induced unsatisfactory cost distributions push actors to deviate from cooperation.
Conclusion
The case of end-of-life vehicles (ELVs) can be representative of a class of policy issues in which the dynamic-incentive effect of EIs takes place in very complex industrial systems. To achieve policy objectives and targets, interrelated sequences of single innovations in both upstream (car making) and downstream (car recycling/recovery) of the ELV system, which give rise to different 'innovation paths', should take place. Our main aim was to explore how the introduction of EIs can influence the behaviour of industrial actors towards different 'innovation paths'. This is equivalent to explore if the chosen EI and/or its practical configuration can be considered as being neutral with respect to dynamic-efficiency. The possible impact of a free take-back (FTB) instrument on innovation paths has been considered.
Our main conclusion is that, when EIs are introduced inside complex and systemic industrial settings, their dynamic efficiency can critically depend, even ex ante, on which specific industry/activity the EI is directly applied, on its position in the innovation process, on its market power and its relationships with other industries, on the technological and organisational capabilities of these industries. In other words, different innovation paths, including paths not preferred by policy makers, may emerge from the matching of actors' innovation role and actors' (expected) share of the policyinduced cost/benefit impact. Differently from static neoclassical approaches, where the cost/benefit impact of the EI and its formulation is neutral with respect to policy effectiveness, the effects of EIs in systemic and dynamic settings critically depend on where, along the 'production chain', and how, in terms of net cost allocation, the incentive is introduced. Consequently, it is also relevant the extent to which the incentive allocated to a certain industry is transmitted to other industries thus generating second-order effects downward or upward along the chain, i.e. whether a cooperative or a conflicting behaviour towards innovation is stimulated. Disregarding these effects can imply a 'dissipation' of innovation incentives, and possibly the generation of 'regulation-induced rents' for some actors.
Some policy implications may be sketched. Firstly, dynamic-efficiency effects of EIs must be the core of policy concerns when objective achievement depends on innovation. EIs choice should be 'de-linked' from standard general principles, as
Polluter Pays Principle or Producer Responsibility Principle, and it should be considered in an effectiveness perspective. The take-off and completion of a preferred 'innovation path' should be the priority in choosing and configuring instruments while cost-benefit distribution and equity considerations should be instrumental to put in motion the appropriate sequence of innovative reactions by the economic actors.
Secondly, despite their ex ante efficiency-related properties, some EIs may be ineffective when implemented because the 'targeted disturbance' they introduce into the system is re-elaborated in unexpected ways by actors' behaviours, including 'innovation-incentive dissipation', 'regulation-induced rents', and cost transfer to final consumers through prices. Then, the analysis of the innovation process involved, of the elements of market power, and of economic-value flows inside the system should come before the choice of policy instruments. in the market for ELVs. We assume that (i) ELVs arising at a specific time are homogenous in terms of "age" and technical features, (ii) there is just one (national) competitive market, and (iii) one equilibrium price for ELVs, at which all transactions take place exists 26 . The number of ELVs delivered to dismantlers by final-owners is represented on the horizontal axis. The negative part of the cost/price vertical axis is placed upside in figures.
Figure A.1 describes a market with a negative equilibrium price before FTB (e.g. the German market). The supply curve for ELVs by final owners (So) is downward sloping for negative prices (i.e. the propensity to deliver ELVs increases for decreasingly negative prices) and become vertical for zero to positive prices at the maximum number of cars becoming ELVs at that time (i.e. final-owners will be ready to deliver all their ELVs for non-negative prices). The cars not delivered are illegally abandoned into the environment, thus accepting the risk of fines and legal costs against the cost of car delivery. The demand curve for ELVs by dismantlers (Do) is upward sloping, starting from a positive price. The dismantling industry has marginal increasing costs in terms of number of treated cars. Dismantlers are willing to pay a positive price for ELVs for a relatively low number of ELVs, but, in order to treat an increasing number of ELVs, they are willing to pay lower and lower positive prices, until they are wiling to pay negative prices for large quantities 27 . The equilibrium price (-po) is initially negative (by assumption) and the quantity of ELVs treated (qo) is less than the maximum available number (i.e. some ELVs will not be delivered and then illegally dumped into the environment).
We assume that FTB reflecting 'producer responsibility' consists of a full reimbursement from a carmaker to final owners for negative prices the latter receive for an ELV of the carmaker's brand. It is introduced together with the obligation for dismantlers to attain higher dismantling rates in terms of car weight (i.e. incremental costs per each car treated) in order to arrive at higher RRR rates. Let us assume for simplicity that incremental dismantling costs are net costs,
i.e. additional dismantled parts/materials have not a market value. As in the FTB included in EU Directive proposal of 1997, dismantlers are free to establish demand prices for ELVs. The FTB scheme is a "free price -full reimbursement" one (FPFR-FTB). With FPFR-FTB, both supply and demand curves shift. The possibility of full reimbursement for the costs of ELV delivered induce final-owners to deliver all their ELVs and the supply curve will shift rightward to become SFTB (i.e. vertical at the maximum number qFTB, completely inelastic to paid or received prices).
Given demand prices for ELVs are freely established, the change of the demand curve of dismantlers cannot be defined ex ante. The increasing costs of incremental dismantling would surely shift the demand curve upward in order to cover the incremental costs, and the willingness to pay positive prices decreases. FTB affects the price at which ELVs are accepted by dismantlers: this price is likely to become increasingly negative.
Figure A.1. FTB introduction with initial negative equilibrium price for ELVs same age where competition between dismantlers pushes towards one single equilibrium price. 27 A slightly more realistic interpretation is that the curve represents the demand by a very large number of very small dismantlers with different efficiency in treating the same cars. The more efficient dismantlers have low treatment costs and are ready to pay positive prices whereas marginally arising quantities of ELVs will be treated by less efficient dismantlers with higher operating costs, the latter being ready to buy ELVs at negative prices only (i.e. they receive ELVs and money from final owners). Transactions take place at the equilibrium price. It is likely that the demand curve starts at zero prices because, with the introduction of FTB, no dismantler is ready to pay a positive price for ELV. The demand increases as a consequence (in the negative price space) for increasingly negative prices (DFTB). Provided that final owners are reimbursed for whatever price they have to pay to dismantlers, and that carmakers do not participate in the transaction, there are not boundaries to the upward shift of the demand curve.
The exact position and slope of the demand curve is therefore not defined ex ante regardless the component related to actual incremental costs of dismantling. The equilibrium price might be -pFTB2, while the equilibrium quantity is qFTB (the maximum number of ELVs available at that time).
In terms of cost-benefit balances, FTB improves the environmental performance because it is reasonable that no car will be abandoned and an increasing amount of materials/parts will be dismantled (and hopefully recovered/reused/recycled). The dismantlers see all their incremental costs covered by payments they receive from final-owners (area -pFTB2 x qFTB), thus the possibility that they can enjoy extra-profits by establishing high negative prices cannot be ruled out. They might actually enjoy a 'regulation-induced rent' corresponding to the part of the producer surplus exceeding total incremental costs and a normal profit on them. Final owners are better off compared with the non-FTB situation (when they paid area po x qo) because they are fully reimbursed and do not pay whatever negative price established by dismantlers. Carmakers support all incremental costs and possible free lunches (if any) through transfers to dismantlers (area -pFTB2 x qFTB). The equilibrium quantity treated is presumably at the maximum level qo/qFTB even in the initial situation (i.e. ELVs are not abandoned given a positive equilibrium price). FPFR-FTB works as above, but cost-benefit implications are different. The environment gains only as a consequence of an incremental dismantling of each ELV (and reuse/recovery/recycling), since all ELVs were already delivered before FPFR-FTB. The transfer to dismantlers will be paid by both final-owners and carmakers. If, as depicted above, with FPFR-FTB and increasing dismantling costs, the dismantlers are not willing to pay positive prices to car final-owners; then final-owners face an opportunity cost (corresponding to the area +po x qFTB) which is essentially a transfer to dismantlers. Carmakers pay a transfer to dismantlers corresponding to the equilibrium negative price -pFTB applied to the number of cars accepted for dismantling (qFTB).
To simplify the analysis, we have not considered that higher dismantling rates of each car may give rise also to direct benefits for dismantlers (together with higher costs) if they are able to sell additional dismantled components and materials at positive prices. Although it does not change the mechanism depicted for FTB, this enlarges the uncertainty on its cost-benefit implications. In a first scenario, FPFR-FTB covers all the incremental costs of dismantling and, then, dismantled materials/parts are offered at "zero prices" to the downstream recycling industries. Another scenario is that FPFR-FTB does not cover all incremental dismantling costs, and the 'normal' loss to dismantlers is only reduced. Another possibility is that, although FPFR-FTB covers all the incremental costs, dismantlers are able to extract positive prices for dismantled materials/parts. With a complete freedom of establishing FPFR-FTB levels, all possibilities emerge; as a consequence the implications for the development of recycling chains along the "material market creation" path are highly uncertain. 
